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Civil No. 7931 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND E. CRANFORD, sometimes known as 
· Roland Cranford, and FRED · C. CLEMORE, 
sometimes known as Fred Clemore, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
H. SPENCER GIBBS, sometimes known as H. S. 
t~ • .. Gibbs, and IDA PEARL GIBBS, husband and 
wife; DELONE JENSEN, sometimes known as 
Dalone Jensen and also as Delone R. Jensen, and 
ESTELL JENSEN, husband and wife; W. 
DANA GIBBS, sometimes known as Dana Gibbs, 
and VERLIE GIBBS, husband and wife; 
' HOWELL MINING COMPANY, a corporation; 
' 
· .'.. R. H. T. DUNSMORE and JANE DOE DUNS-
... · MORE, husband and wife; URBAN JOHNSON 
. · and JANE DOE JOHNSON, husband and wife; 
, :eHIL ROSEQUIST AND ROSE ROSEQUIST, 
.. husband and wife; WALTER J. CROPPER and 
. AILEEN CROPPER, husband and wife; MAN-
~l· ~~ • ·TON C. GIBBS and FLORA B. GIBBS, husband 
~~. , , .and wife; RICHARD R. KENNEDY, sometimes 
known as Richard Kennedy, and ANITA GAE 
KENNEDY, husband and wife; FIRST DOE ; 
· · SECOND DOE; THIRD DOE; FOURTH DOE; 
' · FIFTH DOE ; and SIXTH DOE ; and all other 
persons unknown claiming any right, title, in-
, . terest o.r estate in or lien upon the mining claims 
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint and in the 
pleadings herein adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership 
or clouding their title thereto, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the DistriCt Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
, .A,. · . i-!l .an~_~fM- the County of Sevier 
.... ~\ · · ·· . ·.,·~. '\ ~()NORABLE JOHN L. SEVY, JR., Judge 
"'•·i._.4 \I .\, . '· 
·,~ ' ; '_ ·_ \ ,~ · . . '• CARYEL MATTSSON 
. p~.' \' ~ . .. ·. · and · 
. · JO.HN T. VERNIEU 
( '\ . 
... ~ ... --- -.: .. ,· tr: -: J~ ·~. FOR GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
,... ... ~~.e( ~ .. Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COUR:T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND E. CRANFO):tD, sometimes known as 
Roland Cranford, and FRED C. CLEMORE, 
sometimes known as Fred Clemore, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
H. SPENCER GIBBS, sometimes known as H. S. 
Gibbs, and IDA PEARL GIBBS, husband and 
wife; DELONE JENSEN, sometimes known as 
Dalone Jensen and also as Delone R. Jensen, and 
ESTELL JENSEN, husband and wife; W. 
DANA GIBBS, sometimes known as Dana Gibbs, 
and VERLIE GIBBS, husband and wife; 
HOWELL MINING COMPANY, a corporation; 
R. H. T. DUNSMORE and JANE DOE DUNS-
MORE, husband and wife; URBAN JOHNSON 
and JANE DOE JOHNSON, husband and wife; 
PHIL ROSEQUIST AND ROSE ROSEQUIST, 
husband and wife; WALTER J. CROPPER and 
AILEEN CROPPER, husband and wife; MAN-
TON C. GIBBS and FLORA B. GIBBS, husband 
and wife; RICHARD R. KENNEDY, sometimes 
known ·as Richard Kennedy, and ANITA GAE 
KENNEDY, husband and wife; FIRST DOE; 
SECOND DOE; THIRD DOE; FOURTH DOE; 
FIFTH DOE; and SIXTH DOE; and all other 
persons unknown claiming any right, title, in-
terest or estate in or lien upon the mining claims 
described in Plaintiffs' Complaint and in the 
pleadings herein adverse to Plaintiffs' ownership 
or clouding their title thereto, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Civil No. 7931 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
This is an action to quiet title to certain mining 
claims situate in the Durkee Mining District, Piut~ 
County, Utah, wherein the Defendants counterclaimed 
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to quiet title in themselves to conflicting mining claims. 
Plaintiffs appeal from a Decree of the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in and for Piute County, Utah, which de-
termined that Plaintiffs' mining claims were \\:ithout any 
validity and were subsequent and inferior to the mining 
locations of the Defendants and by which the Court 
quieted title in the Defendants H. Spencer Gibbs, son1e-
times known as H. S. Gibbs, W. Dana Gibbs, someti1nes 
known as Dana Gibbs, Del one Jensen, sometimes known 
as Dalone Jensen and also as Del one R. Jensen, I\ianton 
C. Gibbs, Richard R. Kennedy, sometimes known as 
Richard Kennedy, and Walter J. Cropper. Appellants 
also appeal from the Order of said Court denying their 
Motion for a New Trial. These Appellants contend that 
the lower Court has misapplied proven facts and that 
said Decree is clearly against the weight of the evidence, 
sufficient to merit a reversal of said Decree or a new 
trial of this cause upon the merits. 
S·TATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the filing of an Appli-
cation for Appointment for Guardian Ad Litem for 
Roland E. Cranford, a minor, one of the Plaintiffs, on 
October 11, 1950 (R. 1). Thereafter the Court made and 
entered its Order appointing Lucy H. Cranford ClenlOI'C 
as such Guardian Ad Litem (R. 4). Plaintiffs' Con1plaint 
(R. 6) was filed November 1, 1950. In it, Plaintiffs al-
leged that on or prior to the 31st day of May, 1950, tlw 
premises therein described as Juanita #1, #2 and #~~ 
Mining Claims were vacant, unoccupied and unclai1ned 
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lands of the United States of An1erica, subject to location 
under the mining la-\vs thereof; that upon said date, the 
Plaintiffs and one Kent F. Clemore entered upon and 
explored said premises and found thereon rock in place 
bearing valuable minerals; and that thereupon they lo-
cated and appropriated as and for mining claims said 
properties in the manner and method therein stated, in-
cluding the erection and location of monuments and the 
posting and recording of written Notices of Location. 
Plaintiffs also alleged that on or prior to the 20th day of 
July, 1950, the premises therein described as Debra F'rac-
tion #10 Mining Claim was vacant, unoccupied and un-
claimed lands of the United States of America, subject 
to location under the mining laws thereof; that upon said 
date the Plaintiffs and one Kent F~. Clemore entered upon 
and explored said premises and found thereon rock in 
place bearing valuable minerals; and that thereupon they 
located and appropriated as and for mining claim said 
property in the manner and method therein stated, in-
cluding the erection and location of monuments and the 
posting and recording of written Notices of Location. It 
was then alleged that said Plaintiffs, at all times since 
said respective locations, have remained in possession 
of said claims and have worked and improved the same 
in compliance with the mining laws and customs of Utah 
and the United States of America. 
Plaintiffs then alleged in their Complaint that the 
D·efendants pretended to have, own and claim certain al-
leged mining claims referred to as Yell ow Canarie #1, #2 
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and #3, Yell ow Canarie Fraction and Yell ow Canarie 
Fraction #2 in the same physical area as Plaintiffs· 
Claims, and conflicting therewith, and that by reason 
thereof Defendants claimed some right, title, interest or 
equity in and to the claims of the Plaintiffs, or son1e part 
thereof, and that said right, title, interest or equity thus 
claimed by Defendants was without any validity whatso-
ever insofar as it conflicted with Plaintiffs' claims. Plain-
tiffs prayed for a Decree quieting their title. 
By way of Answer (R. 15) the answering Defend-
ants H. Spencer Gibbs, sometimes kno"\vn as H. S. Gibbs, 
and Ida Pearl Gibbs, husband and wife, W. Dana Gibbs, 
sometimes known as Dana Gibbs, and Verlie Gibbs, hus-
band and wife, Del one Jensen, sometimes kno'vn as 
Dalone Jensen and also as Del one R. Jensen, and Estell 
Jensen, husband and wife, Manton C. Gibbs and Flora B. 
Gibbs, husband and wife, Richard R. Kennedy, son1etin1es 
known as Richard Kennedy, and Anita Gae Kennedy, 
husband and wife, a.nd Walter J. Cropper and Aileen 
Cropp·er, husband and wife, and Phil Rosequist and Rose 
Rosequist, husband and wife, denied all of Plaintiffs' alle-
gations except for the recordation of Plaintiffs' Notices 
of Location. Said D·efendants also counterclai1ned (R. 
16) and alleged that on or prior to the respective dates 
therein mentioned extending from April 25, 1949, to 
s:eptember 27' 1950, the premises therein described as 
Yellow Canarie #1, #2 and #3, Yell ow Canarie -F'raction, 
Yellow Canarie Fraction #1, #2 and #4 (italics ours) 'vere 
vacant, unoccupied and unclaimed lands subject to lora-
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tion under the n1ining laws of Utah and the United States 
of America: that upon specific dates therein named, cer-
tain of said answering Defendants entered upon said 
lands and located and appropriated the same for mining 
clanns; and that said Defendants have at all times re-
mained in possession thereof and have worked and iin-
proved said claims in compliance with law. Defendants 
alleged that Plaintiffs' pretended claims in the same area 
were without any legal validity whatever insofar as they 
conflicted with Defendants' claims, and pTayed for a 
Decree quieting their title. 
By Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 23) the 
same Defendants alleged the recording of certain Amend-
ed Notices of Location on Yell ow Canarie #1, #2 and #3 
Mining Claims. They also added to the list of Claims up-
on which they were seeking to quiet title the following: 
Independence, Independence Fraction, Anita Gae #1, 
Grover Gibbs F'raction, Grover Gibbs F'raction #2, Lucky 
Strike #2, and the Claim known as the "Fraction". 
Plaintiffs' Reply (R. 32) denied each and every alle-
gation of Defendants' Amended Counterclaim. 
After the trial, the Court made and entered Findings 
of .Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 38) in substantial 
conformity to the allegations of said Amended Counter-
claim, and by Decree (R. 50) quieted title in the Defend-
ants named therein to all of the claims set forth in said 
Amended Counterclaim except that in neither the Find-: 
ings and Conclusions n~r Decree is any mention made 
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whatsoever of the Grover Gibbs Fraction, Yellow Canarie 
Fraction #1 #2 and #4 all four of 'vhich Claims the 
' ' Counterclaiming Defendants sought to quiet title to in 
their .. A .. 1nended Counterclaim. The objections urged to 
said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and to 
said Decree in Plaintiffs' 1\Iotion for aNew Trial (R .. 53) 
went to the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
Judgn1ent and Decree entered; that the Judgment and 
Decree were against the law, and that the Court com-
mitted error in law. Plaintiffs' Motion for a New 
Trial was denied by Order of the Court dated October· 
~4, 1952 (R. 54). 
Subsequent to the location of Plaintiffs' claims, Kent' 
F. Clemore, one of the locators thereof, and his wife, 
conveyed to the Plaintiff, Fred C. Clemore, all of their 
right, title and interest in and to the Juanita #1, #2 and 
#3, and Debra Fraction #10 Mining Claims, Exhibit 7. 
At the commencement of the trial, the action was dis-
missed without prejudice as to the Defendants R. H. T. 
Dunsmore and Jane Doe Dunsmore, husband and 'vife: 
Urban Johnson and Jane Doe Johnson, husband and 
wife; First Doe, Second Doe, Third Doe, F'ourth Doe, 
Fifth Doe and Sixth Doe, and any and all unknown de-
fendants named in the action (R. 73). The sole remaining 
Defendant who did not Answer and Counterclai1n, Howell 
Mining Company, a corporation, filed no responsiYt~ 
pleading, made no appearance, the action was not dis-
missed as to it, its default was never entered, and the 
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Court's Decree contained no judgment for or against 
this D·efendant. 
Uranium-bearing ores were discovered in commercial 
quantities in the area surrounding Marysvale, Piute 
County, Utah, in the year 1948 (R. 566). This discovery 
started a "Uranium Rush" and a large number of mining 
claims were located by various pers,ons, including 65 
claims by the Defendant, H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 313). 
Plaintiffs contend that on April 25, 1949, the Defendants 
H. Spencer Gibbs, Dana Gibbs and Del one Jensen lo-
cated two mining claims referred to as Yell ow Canarie 
#1 and Yellow Canarie #2, and that said claims were 
originally established two miles northeast of Marys-
vale, Utah, along the old Piute County Highway leading 
from Marysvale to Monroe, Utah. Plaintiffs further con-
tend that some time thereafter said mining claims and 
the monuments and markers in connection therewith were 
moved from their original physical locations along said 
old County Highway to an entirely new area located one 
and one-half to two miles north of the point of original 
location. No new Notices of Location were posted, nor 
were new Notices recorded, as required by law, at that 
time, reliance being had upon the original Notices of 
Location and the recordings thereof. Hence, Plaintiffs 
take the position that Defendants' claims as moved and 
re-established in the new area were and are null and 
void, and that therefore this land was vacant and un-
occupied and subject to location and appropriation as and 
for mining claims by the Plaintiffs, who located their 
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claims in said new area prior to the actual date of re-
cordation of amended Notices on the original Yellow 
Canarie Claims, or the location of new and additional 
claims in said new area. 
Plaintiffs' case is grounded upon the long established 
principal of law that once a locator of mining claims es-
tablishes his claims at a given location, erects discovery 
monuments and corner stakes, and posts and records 
Notices of Location, describing the physical location of 
said claims by reference to some natural object or per-
Inanent monument as will identify the claims, he is there-
after bound by his own actions and declarations and he 
may not at a later date move the physical location of said 
claims to a new area and claim this as his own by relying 
upon his original locations and recordings and the prior-
ity they otherwise would give him. Instead, if he desires 
to locate a new area, he must do so in full con1pliance 
with the Statutes the same as if the original locations 
in the abandoned area had never been made and must 
start anew and take each required step without seeking 
to gain any benefit or priority out of the original loca-
tions. 
In this Brief and for purposes of clarity, the area 
where Plaintiffs contend that Defendant H. Spencer 
Gibbs originally located his Yellow Canarie Claims, which 
is located approximately two 1niles northeast of 1\farys-
vale, Utah, along the east side of the Old Piute County 
Highway, and which is shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit () 
midway between the N. and S. boundaries of Section 1 n, 
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To,vnship 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, 
and near the west boundary of said S:ection 16, will be 
hereinafter referred to as ~'Area #1". Also, the area 
vvhere Plaintiffs contend that the Defendants subse-
quently moved the Yellow Canarie Claims without any 
compliance with governing law as to posting and record-
ing of nevv Notices of Location and \Vhere the Defend-
ants chose to locate numerous other conflicting and 
overlapping claims for the purpose of confusing the 
entire situation and camouflaging their moving and 
transplanting of the Yellow Canarie Claims, which area 
is situated near the center of Section 4, Township 27 
South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Meridian (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 5) and is outlined in a red square on Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 6, will hereinafter be referred to as "Area #2". 
The testimony and evidence concerning these and 
other matters is voluminuos and will be reviewed in de-
tail in connection with the argwnents hereinafter made. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OFFERED 
AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS AND IS 
ENTIRELY INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION 
MADE AND THE DECREE RENDERED. 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE DECREE ENTERED HEREIN IS AGAINST 
THE LAW. 
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POINT 3. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN. 
LAW. 
POINT 4. 
THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND REC-
ORD IN. THIS CAUSE, NEW FINDINGS OF FACT, CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ENTERED. 
POINT 5. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGU·MENT 
POINT 1. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY OFFERED 
AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS AND IS 
ENTIRELY INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION 
MADE AND THE DECREE RENDERED. 
This is an action in equity. The scope of review on 
appeal in equity cases is clearly settled in this jurisdic-
tion. 
"This Court is authorized by the State Consti-
tution to review the findings of the trial eourt in 
equity cases, but the findings of the trial eourts 
on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unlP~~ 
it manifestly appears that the court has IHi~np­
plied proven faets or 1nade findings elearly 
against the weight of the evidence." 
Olivero vs. Eleganti, 61 l 1 tah -t. 7:>, ~I ..f. P. 
313. 
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To the sa1ne effect is Stanley vs. Stanley, 97 Utah 
520, 94 P. 2d 465, in 'vhich the Court collates the au-
thorities on this point. \V e concede, therefore, that Plain-
tiffs, in order to succeed on this appeal, have the burden 
of convincing this Court that the lower Court misapplied 
proven facts and made Findings clearly against thl~ 
weight of the evidence. For convenience and clarity, the 
pivotal issues of fact upon 'vhich a correct determina-
tion .depends will be grouped and argued as follows: 
A. Original location of Defendants' Yellow Canarie 
Claim in Area #1 along the old Piute County Highway, 
approximately two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah. 
B. Subsequent moving of Defendants' Yellow 
Canarie Claims by the Defendants to Area #2 located 
approximately two miles north of their original point of 
establishment and without new recordation of Notices 
of Location or compliance with other statutory require-
ments. 
C. Manner, method and place of location and es-
tablishment of Plaintiffs' claims in Area #2. 
D. Subsequent acts of Defendants ih moving, 
amending, modifying, confusing, and overlapping claims 
in Area #2, including making of conflicting new locations. 
A. ORIGINAL LOCATION OF DEFENDANTS' YELLOW 
CANARIE CLAIMS IN THE AREA #1 ALONG THE OLD 
PIUTE COUNTY HIGHWAY, APPROXIMATELY TWO 
MILES NORTHEAST OF MARYSVALE, UTAH. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 consists of two United States 
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Geographical Survey Quadrangle Sheets stapled together 
showing all of the outstanding physical characteristics 
of the land surrounding Marysvale, Utah, and involved 
in this litigation. These sheets bear a date of 1945 and 
show existing conditions as of that time. They show, 
among other things, that a "graded road" extends in a 
northerly direction from Marysvale, Utah, into Sections 
21, 16 and 9 of Township 27 South, Range 3 \Vest of the 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian (R. 118). A. R. Shelton, 
licensed United States Mineral Surveyor, fixed the loca-
tion of the area now covered by Plaintiffs' and Defend-
ants' disputed mining claims (Area #2) as being in Sec-
tion 4, Township 27 South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and he enclosed said area in a red 
penciled square on Exhibit 6 (R. 118). This is the sam.e 
area as shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5, which is a large 
map of Area #2, prepared by Mr. Shelton, and " 7hirh 
will be referred to in detail hereinafter. 
Shelton testified that Exhibit 6 shows that the road 
above referred to does not enter or approach the area 
now in dispute (Area #2) but that it by-passes it to the 
south by a distance of one mile (R. 119). According to 
Exhibit 6 and according to the testimony of I)ratt ~r<'g­
miller, the original discoverer of uraniu1n in the l\larys-
vale area who also owns mining claims in Area #2 (H. 
204), there was neither road nor trail of any nature going 
into, crossing or approaching the area included in the 
red square on Exhibit 6 (R. 120), \Vhich is the area in-
volved in the present litigation, prior to thP di~coVPl'Y 
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of uraniun1 in Area #2 in 1948. This was true vvhen De-
fendants' claims were located in 1949 (R. 204). 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 is the original Notice of Loca-
tion for Defendants' Yello\v Canarie #1 lvfining Claim. 
The instrument bears the signature of H. Spencer G-ibbs 
and is dated April 25, 1949. It refers to the location of 
said Claim as being "one mile east of Sevier River on 
Old County Highvray two miles North East of !1arys-
vale, Utah". 
D·efendants' Exhibit "B" is a copy of the original 
Location Notice of Defendants' Yello\v Canarie #2 Claim. 
It is dated April 25, 1949. The location of this Clailn 
is therein stated as follows : "Joins Yellow Canarie #1 
on the north end line and is located two miles northeast 
of Marysvale, Utah along Old County Highway". De-
fendants' Exhibit "C" is a copy of the original Location 
Notice of Defendants' Yellow Canarie Clairn #3 dated 
June 7, 1949. The location of this Claim is therein stated 
as follows: "Joins Yellow Canarie west side line #2". 
The physical location of the three claims described in 
these Notices of Location was the subject of much of 
Plaintiffs' evidence. 
Fred C. Clemore, one of the Plaintiffs, an experi-
enced miner, who resided at Marysvale, Utah, testified 
that prior to December, 1949, he had heard certain . 
"rumors and gossip" concerning the original location 
of the Yellow Canarie Mining Claims and the subsequent 
moving of these claims to new locations (R. 132). During 
April or May, 1950, Pratt Seegmiller, the original dis-
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coverer of uranium-bearing ores in the Marysvale area, 
pointed out to Clen1ore the exact original location of the 
Yell ow Canarie Claims, including the large pinnacle or 
cone-shaped formation of yellow colored rock which 
served as the discovery monuument (R. 135). The ground 
shovvn to Clemore was Area #1 located approximately 
one and one-half miles south of the area enclosed in 
the red square (Exhibit 6) and immediately adjoined 
the right or east side of the Old County Highway as it 
·extends north fron1 Marysvale, Utah (R. 136). Clemore 
fixed the location of this area with an "X" or cross in 
ink upon Exhibit 6 near the letters "BM" in the north-
west quarter of Section 16, Township 27 South, Range 3 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (R. 164), and he 
testified that the coloration of the rock here is distinctly 
yellow (R. 165). H·e testified that he was present at this 
spot when the original Notice of Location of Defendant 
H. Spencer Gibbs on Yellow Canarie #1 was found at the 
base of a cone-shaped discovery monument (R. 166). 
Leonard Anderson, a resident of Elsinore, Utah, for 55 
years, who is part owner of certain mining claims in 
or near the disputed ·area, testified (R. 197 to R. 201) 
that he had regularly traveled over the road leading fron1 
Marysvale, Utah, across the Sevier River and thence 
north to Monroe, Utah, for a number of years. During 
all of this time the road had been commonly lmown to 
the witness as "the Old Monroe Road" (R. 198), and it 
had never entered, approached or crossed the area now 
in dispute between Plaintiffs and Defendants (Area #2). 
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Pratt Seegmiller, a resident of Marysvale for 15 
years and the O\Yner of 1nining clain1s north of the area 
in dispute in this action, testified ( R .. 204) that he was 
very familiar \Yith the road referred to above. For many 
years, the name conunonly applied to this road has been 
"the Old County Highway~'. This \Vitness testified that 
at no time in his knowledge did this road enter the area 
(Area #2) where Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Claims are 
novv located and \Vhere Mr. s.eegmiller's Claims are like-
\Vise situated, but is removed therefrom a distance of 
about two miles. A road now enters that a.rea but it 
has been constructed recently and since the uranium de-
velopment, it was not there when the claims in dispute 
were located, and it is not now and never has been a part 
of the Old County Highway (R. 204). 
In June of 1949, Seegmiller had a conversation with 
the Defendant, H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 208 to R. 210) con-
cerning the fact that Mr. Seegmiller had discovered on 
his Freedom Clain1s which are located immediately north 
of the area covered by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 (R. 203), Lo-
cation Notices, location monuments and markers refer-
ring to the establishment of the Yellow Canarie Clain1s 
in that area. Seegmiller recalled distinctly that the No-
tice referred to Yellow Canarie Claim #2 and stated 
" ... two·miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, along the 
old county highway" (R. 209). In said conversation Seeg-
Iniller said ( R. 210) : 
"Well, I said, 'the Old County Highway would 
never have run up here, you must have made a 
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mistake putting such a notice out there', and he 
said 'Well, it must have been up through here', and 
when I objected he said, 'vell, he used to run a 
saddle horse up here a few years ago." 
HoV\rever, we note that Gibbs' counsel took a different 
view of· the location of said highway at the trial, for at 
R. 204 appears the following: 
"BY MR. MEL VILLE: Your Honor, I ob-
ject. We don't claim that the old county road goes 
through there. There is no question about that 
fact, and we will stipulate to it." 
Subsequently, Mr. Seegmiller made an investigation to 
determine the exact original location of the Yellow Ca-
narie Claims. Early in July of 1949 he discovered at a 
point located 300 feet fron1. the Old County Highway, ap-
proximately two miles north of the Marysvale Railroad 
D·epot, a natural monument of yellow-colored rock in a 
pinnacle-like' formation and under a pile of rocks on said 
monument a can containing the Notice of Location for 
Yell ow Canarie #1, bearing the signature of H. Spencer 
Gibbs as the locator (R. 215 and 216). Seegmiller identi-
fied Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12 as being the identical Notice 
of Location he thus discovered in place at this point (R. 
216). He fixed this place or point on the U. S. Geological 
Survey Map, Exhibit 6, with a rectangular mark near 
the center of Section 16 in the general Area #1. This 
point is less than one-half the total distance fro1n l\farys-
vale to the area now in dispute between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants. The natural coloration of the rock outcrop-
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pings in this area is distinctly yellow (R. 218). This 
agrees with Clemore's descriptio~ of Area #1 (R. 164 and 
R. 165), the testimony of Roland Lund (R. 257), John T. 
"\:--ernieu (R. 261) and Ethel Seegmiller (R. 245). 
By contrast, Clemore testified that the predominate 
color of the natural rock outcroppings in Area #2 before 
removal of overburden is grayish red (R. 165). Pratt , 
Seegmiller was of the same opinion (R. 219), as was his 
wife, Ethel Seegmiller (R. 245). 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 15 is a photograph of the original 
location of Yellow Canarie #1 at the point marked by 
Seegmiller on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, showing the location 
monument in the foreground and the County Highway in 
the background with Mr. Seegmiller's truck parked there-
on (R. 220). This photograph was taken about July 10, 
1949, by Seegmiller or his wife. 
Ethel Seegmiller, the wife of Pratt Seegmiller, cor-
roborated her husband's testimony regarding the finding 
of the location monument and Notice of Location of 
Yellow Canarie #1 in Area #1 along the Old County 
Highway (R. 242-243). She identified Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
12 as the identical Notice of Location found on the scene 
(R. 244). She also corroborated the testimony of other 
of Plaintiffs' witnesses about the location and identity 
of the "Old County Road" and about the yellow colora-
tion in the Area #1, and testified as to the absence of 
yellow coloration in Area #2 before the overburden is 
removed ( R. 245). 
Roland Lund, a resident of Marysval~ for 19 years, 
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testified that he was very fa1niliar with the road run-
ning north and east of Marysvale, Utah, commonly known 
as the "Old County Highway", and tha.t he had traYeled 
it on many occasions ( R. 254). In the su1nn1er of 1930, 
Mr. Lund, while hunting, discovered a monun1ent ap-
proximately four feet high situated fifty feet east of said 
road and approximately two miles northeasterly of 
Marysvale upon· which were written words and figures 
referring to the monument as being one of the corner 
stakes of a Yellow Canarie Claim (R. 255). Lund de-
scribed the coloration of the rock outcroppings in this 
area as being predominately yellow. Mr. Lund was enl-
ployed as a miner on the F'reedom Claims at the time of 
the trial, and he estimated that the F·reedom #2 Clailn, 
which is shown by other evidence to be in Area #2, was 
approximately two miles northerly of the point of his 
discovery of the Yell ow Canarie monument along the 
"Old County Highway". 
John T. Vernieu, one of Plaintiffs' counsel, testified 
(R. 259 to 261) that on August 9, 1951 (five days before 
the trial) while inspecting the original location of Yellow 
Canarie #1 along the Old County Highway at a point 
approximately one and one-half to two miles northeast 
of Marysvale, in the company of F'red C. Clemore, he 
came upon the original Notice of Location of Yell ow 
Canarie #1, Exhibit 12. It was found in a tobacco can 
under a pile of rocks at the top of a rock pinnacle about 
300 feet east of the road (R. 260). It was stipulated he-
tween counsel that the signature on Exhibit 12 ,vns that 
of Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 261). 
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We submit that the foregoing testimony and evi-
dence clearly establish that Y ello'v Canarie Claims #1, 
#2 and #3 were originally located by the Defendant H. 
Spencer Gibbs on April25, 1949, April25, 1949, and June 
7, 1949, respectively, at a point approximately two miles 
north and east of Marysvale, Utah, along the Old Piute 
County Highway (Area #1). The original location monu-
ment and Notice of Location for Yellow Canarie #1 were 
observed in this area by four witnesses at tin1es extend-
ing from early July, 1949, to August 9, 1951, and one of 
the corner monuments of one of these claims was seen 
by a fifth witness in Area #1 in the summer of 1950. 
Plaintiff Clemore went so far as to say that it was 
"rumor and gossip" that the Yellow Canarie Claims were 
originally located in Area #1 and they thereafter had 
"flown" ( R. 132) to Area #2. Furthermore, the Loca-
tion Notices for Yellow Canarie #1 and #2 which were 
admittedly prepared by Defendant Gibbs, who after all 
should best know the true location of his claims, recite 
upon their faces, both by reference to fixed and well-
defined points (on or along Old County Highway and two 
miles northeast of Marysvale), that they are located 
precisely .where Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that they 
found evidence of the same, and Yellow Canarie #3 is 
tied to that same Area #1 by the recital in the Location 
Notice thereof that it joins Yellow Canarie #2. We think 
it significant that Defendants' record is barren of any 
direct denial of the originalloca tion of these claims along 
the Old County Highway. Moreover, as early as April 
29, 1949, Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs knfJw that the area 
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where he now contends that his Yellow Canarie Claiins 
are located (Area #2) was not two miles northeast of 
Marysvale, Utah, as he stated in his original Notices of 
Location on Yellow Canarie Claims #1 and #2, but rather 
that it was in fact four miles north of Marysvale, Utah, 
as Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and 6 clearly show it to be, for 
on April 29, 1949, four days after the location of Yellow 
Canarie Claims #1 and #2, Gibbs located his alleged 
Lucky Strike #2 in Area #2 and he fixed its location as 
being "south of Pratt Seegmiller's Freedom Clain1 #3 
and about four miles north of Marysvale" (Defendants' 
Exhibit K, and R. 372 and 373). Defendants' own map 
of Area #2 (Exhibit "AA") and Defendants' Exhibit Z, 
when construed together, show that Freedom Claim 
#3 and the alleged Lucky Strike #2 Claim are not 1nore 
than 1500 feet north of where Defendant H. Spencer 
Gibbs contends that his Yellow Canarie Claims were 
properly located. Yet his own declarations as contained 
in the Notices of Location above referred to, if they are 
to be believed, would of necessity place Lucky Strike #2 
and Yell ow Canarie #1, #2 and #3 at least two miles 
apart. We are confident that this Court will look beyond 
the flimsy film of confusion and the subterfuge thrown 
up by Gibbs to gloss over his obvious removal of the 
Yell ow Canarie Claims from their original locations in 
Area #1 to new and greener pastures in Area #2. Surely, 
Defendants should be bound by their own declarations 
contained in their Notices of Location and ought not now 
to be permitted to deny by indirection their o'vn loca-
tions. 
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In order to arrive at a decision in favor of Defend-
ants and against Plaintiffs, the lo,ver Court must neces-
sarily have concluded that the Yell ow Canarie Claims 
#1 #'2 and #3 \Yere not located and established originally 
' in Area #1. To reach such conclusion the Court must 
have ignored or misapplied the proven facts relative to 
their original physical location in Area #1, brought out 
by the Plaintiff Clemore and several disinterested wit-
nesses, non-parties to this action. Any determination to 
such effect is clearly contrary to the evidence and against 
the weight thereof. 
B. SUBSEQUENT MOVING OF DEFENDANTS' YEL-
LO"V CANARIE CLAIMS BY DEFENDANTS TO AREA #2 
LOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO MILES NOR.TH OF 
THEIR ORIGINAL POINT OF ESTABLISHMENT AND 
WITHOUT NEW RECORDATION OF NOTICES OF LOCA-
TION OR COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER STATUTORY RE-
QUIREMENTS. 
In considering the facts and discussions under the 
instant Argument "B" devoted to the moving by Defend-
ants of their claims fron1 Area #1 to Area #2, we respect-
fully urge the Court to keep in mind the original physi-
cal locations of said claims in Area #1 as shown by the 
discussion under Argument "A" above. The proof clearly 
shows that Yellow Canaries, #1, #2 and #3 were origin-
ally established in Area #1. Subsequently, they were 
found to be in Area #2, the Defendants at all times rely-
ing on their original location dates to give priority in 
time. All the items p·ointed out in Argument "B", when 
considered in the light of the facts developed by Argu-
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1nent "A", including dates, descriptions, geographical 
and physical characteristics of the two areas, spelling 
of the word "Canarie", an1endments to locations, etc., 
lead to the conclusion that Defendants' clain1s "fie"~" 
from Area #1 to Area #2, thus living up to their ornitho-
. logical appellations. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5 is a large map prepared in 
August and November, 1950, by A. R. Shelton, licensed 
United States Mineral Surveyor (R .. 89 and 92). This 
map covers substantially the same area as the property 
herein referred to as Area #2 which is included in the 
red square in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, in Section 4, Town-
ship 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake Base and Merid-
ian, but is in great detail. The map shows the exact loca-
tion of all monuments and corner stakes as determined 
by Mr. Shelton to be actually existing upon the ground. 
Defendants' Yellow Canarie Claims #1, #2 and #3 are des-
ignated in yellow thereon. 
The discovery monument containing a notice of loca-
tion dated April 25, 1949, and the northwest corner stake 
of Yell ow Canarie #1 are shown in the upper righthand 
corner of the map (Northeast part of Area #2). The 
north and east sides thereof are shown in broken linP~ 
because the northeast corner stake was not found by 
Shelton (R. 90). The only markers Mr. Shelton found 
defining the south end line of a Yell ow Canarie Clain1 
in the area covered by the upper part of Exhibit [) refer-
red to the southwest corner, south end center and south-
east corner of Yellow Canarie #2. 
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In the lo,ver center of Exhibit 5, being the south 
central part of the area covered thereby, are found vari-
ous references to stakes and markers shown thereby to 
be Yello"\v Canarie #2 and #3. Yello~u Ca,na.rie #3 is on 
the left or west and 1~ ellow Ca.narie #2 is on the right or 
east (R. 98 and R. 99). Within the boundaries of Yellow 
Canarie #3 was found a location monument containing a 
Notice of Location signed by H. Spencer Gibbs and others 
dated June 7, 1949. Within the boundaries of Yellow 
Canarie #2 "\Vas found a location monument and Notice of 
Location bearing date of April 25, 1949. The monun1ents 
and markers for Yellow Canarie #2 and #3 were "sur-
veyed in" by Shelton between November 28 and N ovem-
ber 30, 1950 (R. 89 and' 98) .. Additional location monu-
ments and corner stakes referring to other claims pur-
portedly located by Defendants in the same area were 
also sho'vn on Exhibit 5, but these will be dealt with at a 
later point herein. 
The major part of the Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs' 
testimony was directed to a detailed recital of the pur-
ported manner of establishing and locating the Yellow 
Canarie Claims in Area #2. According to Gibbs, Yellow 
Canarie #1 was established by him ,and his son, Dana 
Gibbs, south of the Prospector Claims in the south cen-
tral part of Area #2 on the morning of April 25, 1949 (R. 
266). Thereafter, and on the same day, Gibbs contends he 
went some 3,000 feet north of Yellow Canarie #1 where 
he established Yellow Canarie #2 (R. 269). Thus) as 
originally located) Gibbs states that Yellow Ca.narie #2 
was north of Yellow Canarie #1. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
Notices of Location on these clailns were recorded 
April 26, 1949. Early in May, 1949, Gibbs says that he 
and Richard K.ennedy staked the claims and erected cor-
ner monuments (R. 271). Gibbs acknowledged that these 
Claims as originally located in Area #2 had end lines 
well within the Prosp·ector Claims (R. 271). Gibbs says 
that he ()Jnd Del one Jensen then established Yellow Ca-
narie #3 on June 7, 1949, south of the Prospector Claims 
and west of Yellow Canarie #1 (R. 276), although the de-
scription in t;he Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie #3 
says that it is west of Yellow Canarie #2 (Exhibit 3). 
Robert Dunsmore, also known as R. I-I. T. Dunsmore, 
and Urban Johnson, two of the defendants in this action 
against whom the Complaint was dismissed, testified 
that they assisted Mr. Gibbs in the staking of Yellow 
Canarie. #1 and the north end line of Yell ow Canarie #2. 
This occurred on June 13, 1949, and the work was per-
formed under the direction of H. Spencer Gibbs (R. 232 
and 233, and R. 24 7). They testified that Yell ow Canarie 
#1 was staked out as the north claim, and that Yellow 
Canarie #2 was staked as the south claim, so that the 
north end line of Yell ow Canarie #2 was the same as the 
south end line of Yellow Canarie #1. Yell ow Canarie #1 
began at the northwest corner of Prospector Claim #2 
and extended south over this claim from that point (R. 
233 and R. 247). This testimony conflicts directly with 
that of the Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs as to the loca-
tions of Yell ow Canarie #1 and #2. 
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Thereafter, the original Notices of Location of. the 
three Yell ow Canarie Claims were a1nended. The original 
location of Yellow Canarie #1 was amended by Defend-
ants' Exhibit "D". It is dated April25, 1949, but recorded 
June 28, 1950. This amended Notice recites that its pur-
pose is to "more fully describe this claim loca~tion to cor-
rect previou,s mistakes and di.screpancies." Exhibit "E", 
the amendment of Yellow Canarie #2, is also dated April 
25, 1949, but recorded June 27, 1950, and it recites that 
it was made " ... for the purpose of more fully describing 
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner 
posts numbers the changing of location notice by persons 
unknown to me." Exhibit "F'", the amendment of Yellow 
Canarie #3, is dated December 5, 1950, but recorded on 
December 7, 1950. It was made " ... for the purpose of 
correcting any errors in the original location and more: 
accurately and definitely describing and defining the lo-
t. " ca 1on ... 
Under cross-examination H. Spencer Gibbs acknowl-
edged that the amendments to the Yellow Canarie: Claims 
had the effect of changing their size and shape despite 
recitals contained in Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" to the 
' ' contrary (R. 325). Also, Gibbs acknowledged (R. 327) 
that the amendments on Yell ow Canarie #1 and #2 were 
not made on the date recited thereon, but were actually 
made on the dates rec'Orded, that is, on June 28, 1950, and 
June 27, 1950. We quote from R. 327 as follows: 
"Q. Yellow Canarie #3 had been located between 
the time of making your original location of 
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Yellow Canarie #1 and the time you made 
your amendment of #1; is that right~ 
A. The amendment was after we had located the 
Canarie #3. 
Q. But you still went back and relied on the 
original location priority as of April 25, 19±9 '? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, on your amended Notice of Location 
#1, you say in the line just above the words, 
names of locators, 'Located this 25th day of 
April, 1949'. You didn't make the amendlnent 
on that date, did you~ 
A. Well, that ... 
Q. Answer the question. Did you make the 
amendment on that date~ 
A. No. 
Q. Whenever did you make the amendment? 
A. Whenever it says on the paper. 
Q. June 28, 1950; isn't that right~ 
A. That is the date." 
We submit that the testimony of Shelton and Gibbs 
clearly establishes that the Yellow Canarie Claims "flew'' 
to new locations approximately one and one-half 111iles 
north of their original locations along the Old Piute 
County Highway. There can be no doubt that there is 
substantial evidence of the reestablishment of the \' rllow 
Canarie Claims in Area #2 (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and (i). 
However, we most earnestly contend that the weight of 
the evidence clearly establishes that the Yello'v CanariP 
Claims previously had been located som0 distanre south, 
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their original physical locations having been in Area #1. 
If this b~sic premise of Plaintiffs' case is established, 
then the conclusion appears to us to be obvious, to-wit: 
that these claims "\vere moved to new and different loca-
tions at some date between their original date of location 
along "the old county highway" in 1949, and the filings of 
amended Notices of Location in 1950, the Amended No-
tices having been made subsequent to Plaintiffs' Loca-
tions. 
Gibbs at all times relied upon his original Notices of 
Location on the Yellow Canarie Claims to establish prior-
ity of time, even though these Notices recited upon their 
faces that the claims were situated one and one-half to 
tvvo miles south of the place where they are now shown 
to be, Exhibit 5. The amendments to the original loca-
tions were made on June 28, and December 5, 1950, more 
than a year after the original locations. These amend-
ments, Defendants' Exhibits "D", "E", and "F'", do not 
purport to be new locations, but they recite that they 
are made " ... to more. fully describe this claim location 
to correct previous mistakes and discrepancies", Exhibit 
''D"; also, " ... for the purpose of more fully describing 
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner 
post numbers ... ", Exhibit "E"; and also " ... for the 
purpose of correcting any errors in the original location 
of Inore accurately and definitely describing and defining 
the location ... ",Exhibit "F". However, Gibbs may have 
denominated the purpose of these amendments, we sub-
nut that the evidence clearly establishes that the real 
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purpose thereof was a belated attempt to cover up his 
moving the claims to a totally new and different area and 
to place on record descriptions which would confor1n to 
his transfer. 
The amended Notice of Location on Yell ow Canarie 
#1, Exhibit "D", fixes the location of the Claim in 1950 
as being south of the Buddy some 875 feet. The Buddy 
Claim is north of the area shown on Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. 
This is at least one and one-half miles north of any point 
to which the Yellow Canarie #1 Claim was tied by its ori-
ginal Notice of Location, Exhibit 12. If the amendment 
was made merely to correct the original location, Gibbs 
would have found it unnecessary to change the physical 
location by such amendment to an entirely new and dif-
ferent area one and one-half miles north of the original 
location. The same is true of the amendment of Yellow 
Canarie #2, Exhibit E. This amendment recites that as of 
June 27, 1950, the claim is situated north of the Pros-
pector Claims. The Prospectors are located in the north 
part of the area shown by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 5. This is 
about four miles north and east of Marysvale, Utah. 
The original Notice of Location for Yell ow Canarie #2, 
Exhibit "B", recites that the Claim is only two 1niles 
northeast of Marysvale, Utah. If Gibbs made the anwnd-
ment merely to correct the original Notice of Location for 
this claim, why was it necessary for him to amend the lo-
cation and tie it to an entirely new and different areaf 
Further, the original Notice of Location on ·vellow 
Canarie #3, Exhibit "C", recited that the Clai1n joined 
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the 'vest side line of Yellow Canarie #2. By reference to 
the description contained in the original Location Notice 
of Yellow Canarie #2, this \vould 111ean that Yellow Ca-
narie #3 \Yas located in Area #1. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 
shows that Area #1, which is about two miles northeast 
of 1\:Iarysvale, Utah, would be in the northvvest quarter of 
Section 16, Township 27 South, Range 3 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian. I-Iowever, in his amendment to Yellow Canarie 
Claim #3, Gibbs saw fit to change the location of. the 
claim to a point near the center of Section 4, To,vnship 27 
South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
for he used these words, Exhibit "F·", " ... The discovery 
monument of this claim is situate 2565 feet S·outh and 
1626 feet East of the· Northwest corner of Section 4, 
Township 27 South, Range 3 West of the Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, ... ". This is one and one-half to two miles 
north of the place to which original Notice of Location 
for Yellow Canarie Claim #3 was tied. Again we must 
ask, if Gibbs was relying upon the original physical loca-
tion of the Yellow Canarie #3 claim when he amended 
his location thereof, why did he see fit to fix the location 
of the Claim by amendment at a point one an one-half 
to two miles north of the place where his original Notice 
of Location established the claim~ 
We think that this Court will find the answer to these 
questions to be obvious. There can be but one answer-
the three Yellow Canarie Claims were moved by Gibbs 
to new and entirely different locations some time after 
their original establishment, and Gibbs saw fit to lend 
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so1ne measure of respectability to his original locations 
by belated changes in the descriptions through amend-
ments. He wanted to rely upon his original Location No-
tices in order to establish his priority of location. After 
movement of the Claims to "new and greener pastures," 
it was necessary to adjust somehow the descriptions to 
confor1n to the physical facts. It is acknowledged that no 
one actually saw Gibbs or any other of the Defendants 
move the Yellow Canarie Claims from their original loca-
tions along the Old Piute County ~ghway, about two 
miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, to their new location 
in the area covered by Plaintiffs' Exhibits 5 and 6. The 
evidence is very largely circumstantial. Even so, "'e 
contend that the evidence is so strong in Plaintiffs' favor 
and so clearly establishes the movement of the Yellow 
Canarie Claims to an entirely new and different area 
without benefit of new and independent locations and 
recordings that the trial Court's apparent Findings to 
the contrary were clearly against the weight of the evi-
dence sufficient to merit a reversal of its decision by this 
Court. 
C. MANNER AND METHOD OF LOCATION OF PLAIN-
TIFFS' CLAIMS. 
The three Juanita Mining Claims and the Debra 
Fraction #10 Mining Claim were located within the area 
outlined in red in Section 4, Township 27 South, Range 
3 West, Salt Lake Meridian, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6, Area 
#2. These Claims are outlined in blue on Plaintiffs' Ex-
hibit 5. Juanita Claims #1, #2 and #3 were located on 
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May 30, 1950, by Kent F. Cle1nore, Fred C. Clemore and 
Roland E. Cranford, and the Notices of Location thereof 
were recorded on ~tlay 31, 1950, Plaintiffs' Exhibits #1, 
2 and 3. Debra Fraction #10 Claim was located by said 
persons on July :20, 1950, and the Notice of Locatio.n was 
recorded on July 31, 1950, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 4. Subse-
quent to the location of said clain1s, Kent F. Clemore and 
wife quitclaimed all of their right, title and interest i~ 
the Claims to the Plaintiff Fred C. Clen1ore, Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 7. 
Fred C. Clemore testified that during the spring of 
1950 he became interested in the mining property within 
Area #2. Information came to hi1n regarding the estab-
lishment of the Yellow Canarie Claims within. this area 
(R. 134). He exan1ined the recorded Notices of Location 
for the Yellow Canarie Claims in the office of the Piute 
County Recorder (R. 139). At this time no Amended 
Notices of Location on the Yellow Ca.narie Claims had 
been recorded. The original. Notices of Location then of 
record identified the location of these claims as being 
situated two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah, and 
along the Old County Highway (R. 140). From the read-
ing of said Notices, which by virtue of the recitals therein 
referred to the Claims as being in Area #1, and by 
reason of the fact that Clemore had observed certain 
Yellow Canarie monuments and stakes within the area 
herein referred to as Area #2, he concluded that the Yel-
low Canarie Claims had been moved from their original 
locations in Section 16 and had "flown" to one and one-
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half to two miles north into the Area #2 in S.ection 4 with-
out benefit of new recordings or other compliance with 
statutory requirements. He therefore concluded that 
the ground covered by the Yell ow Canarie Claims in Sec-
tion 4, Exhibits 5 and 6, was vacant land and was open to 
location for mining claims (R. 183). On May 30, 1950, 
Clemore and Roland Cranford 'vent into Area #2 covered 
by Exhibit 5 for the purpose of locating mining claims. 
Clemore described the natural coloration of the terrain 
in this area as being grayish red, as distinguished from 
the predominate yellow coloring of the terrain in Sec-
tion 16, where the Yellow Canarie Claims were originally 
located (R. l65). 
After Plaintiffs located the boundaries of adjoin-
ing claims and ascertained that they were not. interfering 
therewith (R. 141 and 149), they dug into the ground 
in search of an ore discovery. Uranium bearing ores 
were identified in place by Clemore through the use of a 
Geiger Counter on all three of the properties located as 
Juanita Claims (R. 141). Assays were also made by 
Clemore and in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 142). There-
after, location monuments consisting of rock piles with 
2x4's placed in the middle thereof were erected on the 
sites, and Notices of Location were prepared and placed 
in tobacco cans under the monuments on each of the 
claims (R. 142). Juanita Claim #1 was located as the 
middle or central claim, and Juanita #3 and #2 were lo-
cated west and east thereof, respectively (R. 14:2-143). 
Copies of the original Notices were filed for record the 
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next day, ~lay 31, 1950. The discovery monuments for 
Juanita Claims #1 and #2 'vere identified and "surveyed 
in" by A. R. Shelton at the time he prepared Exhibit 5 
(R. 103) in substantially the same position as originally 
established. The discovery monument of Juanita #3 
was not identified or "surveyed in" by Shelton, but Cle-
more fixed the location thereof with a circled cross a p-
proximately one-half inch south on Exhibit 5 of the 
south boundary of the Prospector #4 Clain1 at a- point 
approximately 20 feet east of an access road which now 
crosses the claim (R. 147). The corner and end center 
stakes on Juanita #1 and #2 were erected on May 31, 
1950. While erecting the same, Clemore observed, within 
the area located by him, monuments, stakes and markers 
referring to the Yellow Canarie Claims. At this time 
Yellow Canarie #2 was situated in the same area as the 
location of Juanita #2, and Juanitas #1 and. #3 were lo-
cated in the same general area as Yellow Carn.arie #3 (R. 
150). Clemore did not observe sufficient markers or 
monuments in this immediate area to enable him to 
identify the existence of any Yellow Canarie #1 Claim. 
Clemore testified that at the time of location of his 
Juanita Claims he did not find any evidence of conflict 
between his Juanita Claims and any other claims of the 
Defendants, although he made a careful search of the 
area (R. 154), nor were any markers or stakes found re-
ferring to the location of Anita Gae, Lucky Strike #2, 
Grover Gibbs Fraction, Fraction, or Yellow Canarie 
Fractions #1, #2 and #4 within the boundaries of the 
Juanita Claims (R. 155). However, at a later date, mark .. 
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ers and monuments referring to the location of this area 
by Defendants under Claim names last set forth abo·\ye 
began to appear in this area. 
Debra Flraction #10 Claim was located by Clen1ore 
and Cranford on July 20, 1950, and a copy of the original 
Notice of Location was recorded on July 31, 1950. This 
claim is shown in the northeast part of the area covered 
by Exhibit 5, and is outlined in blue (R .. 156). Some evi-
dence of the Yellow Canarie Claim #2 was observed near 
the south boundary of this Claim at the time of location 
(R. 159). The same procedure with reference to deter-
mination of boundaries of adjoining claims, discovery 
of uranium-bearing ores in place, erection of discovery 
monument, preparation, posting and recording of Notice 
of Location, and staking of corner and end center nlonu-
ments as was followed in locating the Juanita Clailns, 
was employed by Clemore on the Debra Fraction #10 
(R. 157). 
Beginning as early as June 10, 1950, and on at least 
three different occasions thereafter (R. 610), Cle1nore 
found that several of the monuments, Location Notiec~ 
and corner stakes on the Juanita Claims had been 111oved 
by unknown persons to new and different locationR, or 
had been obliterated entirely. The location 1nonu1nent~. 
Notices of Location, and some corner stakes of Juanita #2 
were moved to a point within the boundaries of Pro~­
pector Clain1 #3 (R. 148). These n1onuments, along with 
copies of the original Location Notices, were rephu·t>d 
by Cle1nore in their original positions south of the north 
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solid blue line of Juanita #1 and #2, being the north end 
line thereof, as often as he found that they had been 
disturbed (R. 171). On June 26, 1950, after observing 
that his monuments and stal~es had been obliterated and 
moved a second time, Clemore obtained certain "claim 
cups", Exhibit 14, and he buried one containing the name 
of each clai1n at the discovery monument of each of his 
Juanita Clailns (R. 171). All of these "claim cups", ex-
cept for Juanita #3, were in position at the site of the 
original location monuments as of May, 1951, although 
the actual monuments and many of the other markers 
had been obliterated a third time. The discovery and 
location monument of Juanita #3 was destroyed some 
time prior to this by excavation work of the Defendants 
(R. 172). Such of the corner stakes and location monu-
ments of Plaintiffs' Juanita #3 as rema'ined in place in 
November, 1950, were identified and "surveyed in" by 
A. R. Shelton on Exhibit 5. Clemore further testified 
that as of recent date a number of stakes and monu-
Inents referring t<;> new mining locations claimed by the 
D·efendants began to· make their appearance within the 
boundaries of the J uanitas and the Debra Fraction #10. 
We contend that the weight of the evidence clearly 
shows that Plaintiffs Clemore and Cranford complied 
with every affirmative legal requirement for the valid 
location of Juanita #1, #2 and #3, and Debra F'raction 
#10 Mining Claims, and that they were fully entitled 
under said evidence to a Decree of the lower Court quiet-
ing ___ their title thereto. It is admittedly true that Plain-
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tiffs' three Juanita Claims conflict with and cover sub-
stantially the same ground as D·efendants' Independence 
Claim and two of the three Yellow Canarie Claims as 
now situated. Also, Defendants' Debra Fraction #10 
Claim conflicts with and covers substantially the sa1ne 
ground as Defendants' Anita Gae, Grover Gibbs Frac-
tion, "Fraction", and the other of Defendants' Yellow 
Canarie Claims. We confess that we find it impossible, 
and we sincerely state that this Court will find it iinpos-
sible, to determine from the evidence and from the testi-
mony of Defendant H. S.pencer Gibbs exactly \Yhere in 
Area. #2 he now contends each of the Yellow Canarie 
Claims is located. The constant shuffling back and forth 
in Area #2 of the Yello\\ ... Canarie Claims will be dealt 
with in more detail under a separate heading herein-
after. Suffice it to say at this point that a careful exarn-
ination of the original Notices of Location of the Yell ow 
Canarie Claims, the testin1ony and maps of Plaintiffs' 
and Defendants' own surveyors, and the testi1nony of 
Defendant Gibbs and other witnesses clearly sho\v that 
the Yellow Canarie Claims have shuttled back and forth 
across Area #2 at least three times since they "floated" 
into this Area. 
Plaintiffs take the position that the Yellow Canarie 
Claims, as now established on the ground covered hy 
Juanita #1, #2 and #3 and Debra F'raction #10, \vere Yoid 
and of absolutely no effect by reason of their having 
been "transplanted" from their original site t\\?O 1niles 
northeast of Marysvale, Utah, and "along the Old County 
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Highway'' to this new area ·w·ithout benefit of any com-
pliance with the statuto1·y requiren1ent of posting and 
recording new Notices of Location showing the true and 
correct location of said Claims. Therefore, the land now 
occupied by the Yello'v Canarie Claims on Exhibit 5 was 
open and unoccupied ground, su~ject to location for min-
ing claims by the Plaintiffs on the dates of location of 
their Claims. 
The testimony of Clemore 'vith respect to the manner 
and method of location of Juanita #1, #·2 and #3 and 
Debra Fraction #10 Claims was clear and uncontroverted 
and is substantiated by the physical evidence of such 
of the discovery monuments and corner stakes.as remain-
ed in place at the time A. R. Shelton surveyed the area, 
Exhibit 5. Defendants attack these locations, not by any 
direct evidence going to the failure of Plaintiffs to prop-
erly locate their claims pursuant to statutory require-
ments, or to locate them in the areas Plaintiff Clemore 
testified to, but rather by a great labyrinth of confusing, 
contradictory and self-serving testimony that certain of 
Plainiffs' monuments and corner stakes were observed 
by them in other areas and within the boundaries of 
other claims. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute this. In fact, Clemore testi-
fied that on at least three differen't occasions after his 
original discovery and staking work had been completed, 
he found that his monuments and stakes had been moved 
onto other claims, and Exhibit 5 shows that certain of 
the Juanita and Debra Fraction #10 monuments and 
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stakes were in fact within the boundaries of the Pros-
pector and Independence Claims as of November, 1950. 
However, a close inspection of the record 'vill sho"T that 
all of the evidence concerning the movement of these 
monuments and stakes fixes the time of n1ovement sub-
stantially after Plaintiffs' original discoveries. \Ve sub-
mit, therefore, that such evidence begs the question, and 
utterly fails to destroy the validity of Plaintiffs' claims. 
We deem it to be the clearly established law that once 
having validly located their clain1s, Plaintiffs were not 
required, as a matter of law, to preserve the original 
monu1nents and stakes against meddleson1e persons or 
trespassers or the acts of Defendants themselves, so long 
as they did everything reasonably possible to preserve 
their _original positions. 
D. SUBSEQUENT ACTS OF DEFENDANTS IN MOV-
ING, AMENDING, MODIFYING, CONFUSING AND OVER-
LAPPING CLAIMS IN AREA #2, INCLUDING THE MAK-
I;NG OF CONFLICTING NEW LOCATIONS. 
We cannot here do justice to the fascinating narra-
tive contained in the record of the restless and unreinit-
ting "flight" of the Yell ow Canarie Claims back and 
forth across Area #2 subsequent to their entry there-
upon. We will call attention to the significant facts and 
leave it to the Co'urt to read the record and draw its 
conclusions therefrom concerning the motives behin'i the 
shuffle of these claims. 
'Since Defendant H. Spencer Gibbs stoutly Inaintain-
ed that his Yell ow Canarie Claims were originally lo-
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cated in Area #2, he must of necessity rely upon his ori-
ginal Notices of Location for these Claims to give him 
the priority in tune required for this area. No Jnatter 
how said Notices of I.Jocation 1nay be interpreted upon 
other points, vve subn1it that upon this issue they are 
susceptible of but one interpretation, to-wit: As origi-
nally located, vvhether in Area #1 or #2, Yell ow Canarie 
Claim #1 \\yas the south clailn, Exhibit "A." Yell ow 
Canarie #2 was north of Yellow Canarie #1, Exhibit "B" 
(R. 329). Yellow Canarie #3 was west of Yellow Canarie 
#2, Exhibit "C". Under cross-examination, Defendant 
H. Spencer Gibbs fixed the discovery monument of his 
Yellow Canarie #1 (as he contended he originally located 
it, but which is now shown as Yellow Canarie #2 on Exhi-
bit 5, being the southeast Yellow Canarie Claim) by 
placing a red "X" on said Exhibit 5 just south of the 
southwest corner of Prospector Claim #3 (R. 313-4). By 
following the directional course of Yellow Canarie #1 
as contained in the Notice of Location, Exhibit "A", it is 
obvious that Yellow Canarie #1 extended 750 feet north 
from said red "X", directly over and into Prospector #3. 
In fact, Gibbs acknowledged (R. 320) that his north end 
line of Yellow Canarie #1, as he contended he originally 
located it, was on the common sideline of Prospector #2 
and #3, Exhibit 5. The south end line of Yellow Canarie 
#1 he fixed as being midway between the present north 
and south end lines of Yellow Canarie #2, the southeast 
Yellow Canarie Claim, as shown on Exhibit 5 (R. 321). 
Gibbs also admitted that the south end line of Yellow 
Canarie #1 as he- contends he originally located it waG 
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moved south from its original location to connect up \Vith 
the north end line of Independence Claim (R. 322). He 
says he also moved ~he north end line of Yell ow Canarie 
#1 south a distance of about 700 feet. This was done for 
the obvious reason that Yellow Canarie #1, as he says it 
was placed originally, lay directly over Prospector #3. 
It was necessary to move the Claims south to avoid a 
conflict with the prior Prospector Clailns (R. 325). The 
net result of this maneuver was to leave a wide gap be-
tween the north end line of Yellow Canarie #1 (now 
shown as Yellow Canarie #2 on Exhibit 5) and the south 
end line of Yellow Canarie #2 (now shovvn as Yello'v Ca-
narie #1 on said Exhibit and on Defendants' Exhibit 
"AA"). This is directly contra.ry to the description con-
tained in the Notice of Location of Yell ow Canarie #2, 
Exhibit "B", as it states therein that Yellow Canarie #2 
joins the north end line of Yellow Canarie #1. 
The Amended Notice of Location for Yellow Canarie 
#1, Exhibit "D·", recites on its face that Yellow Canarie 
#1 as amended "joins Yell ow Canarie Claim #3 east side 
line." Therefore, by Defendants' own recorded declara-
tions, sometime subsequent to the original establishment 
of Yell ow Canarie Claims in Area #2, the Y ellovv Canarie 
#3 was moved from its original location west of Yell ow 
Canarie #2, being the northeast Yell ow Canarie Claim as 
Gibbs says he located them and as they are described in 
the original Notices of Location, Exhibits "A", "B", "C", 
south to a point where its east side line joined the "~est 
side line of Yellow Canarie #1, the southeast ·Yellow Ca-
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narie Claim. The net result of this maneuver was to 
make Yellow Canarie #3 and #1 parallel in position, com-
pletely contrary to their descriptions and to their original 
placements. According to Gibbs' latest and best estimate, 
the Claims remained in this position as of the date of 
trial that is Y eli ow Canarie #3 is west of Yell ow Canarie 
' ' #1; Yell ow Canarie #2 is north of both Yell ow Canarie 
#1 and #3, but that there is a wide gap between the north 
end line of Yell ow Canarie #1 and the south end line of 
Yellow Canarie #2. In this connection, it is interesting 
to note that Gibbs' testimony concerning the present rela-
tive positions of the Yellow_ Canarie Claims in Area #2 
was directly contrary to his testimony concerning said 
matters at his Deposition prior to the trial (R. 331). 
When the original positions of the Yellow Canarie 
Claims in Area #2 are projected onto Exhibit 5 in rela-
tion to the locations thereon of the Prospector Claims, 
the reasons why Gibbs was so anxious to move YelJow 
Canarie #1 and #3 to new areas become apparent, no 
matter how this dubious shuffle might have to be consum-
mated. The fact of the matter is that Gibbs was not well 
acquainted with Area #2 and existing Claims there when 
he moved the Yellow Canaries into that area. In order 
to place their locations in the same relative positions they 
occupied in Area #1 and as required by his Notices of 
Location, he was forced to place the north half of Yellow 
Canarie #1, the south half of Yell ow Canarie #2, and all 
of Yell ow Canarie #3 directly over the prior and existing 
Prospector Claims. As soon as Gibbs discovered this 
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fact, he shuttled these three clain1s around in a frantic 
attempt to avoid conflict with the Prospector group, and 
yet to preserve his original location date. 
Furthermore, wherever Gibbs may choose to place 
the present location for these Yellow Canarie Clailns in 
Area #2, we note that the stakes and monuments ob-
served on the ground in connection with these clain1s in 
1950 and prior to this action by A. R. Shelton and as 
"surveyed in" by him on Exhibit 5, show that Yellow Ca-
narie #1 was then the north claim, that Y ello\v Canarie 
#2 was south thereof, and that Yellow Canarie #3 \\Tas 
west of Yell ow Canarie #2. Hence, we think that it n1ay 
be said that the Yell ow Canarie Claims had changed 
positions once again. We note with satisfaction, and 
we feel certain that the Court will recognize the signifi-
cance of the fact, that Defendants' own engineer and sur-
veyor, George H. Ryan, established the locations of the 
Yellow Canarie Claims on his map, Exhibit "AA", in sub-
stantial conformity to Shelton's survey of the area. A 
careful examination of these two maps will show that 
there is no rna terial conflict between them as to the loca-
tion of the Yellow Canarie Claims in Area #2 from physi-
cal evidence thereof upon the ground. The fact re1nain:-; 
that both surveys and maps disagree with Gibbs' own 
testimony. 
Thus it becomes apparent that even after the Yellow 
Canarie Claims came into Area #2, not a single one of 
them remained quiescent. Like true, frustrated \varbler~~ 
the Yell ow Canarie Claims hopped back and forth, 
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around and about, at the direction of their owner. We 
assert that, even assuming that the Yellow Canarie 
Claims had their original origin in Area #2, which we 
deny, still the fact of their constant unremitting move-
ment across Area #2 renders them void and of no legal 
effect as valid mining locations. The orderly develop-
ment of mining locations abhors such flaunting of the 
letter and spirit of every rule of mining law. 
To further camouflage the invalidity of the Yellow 
Canarie Claims, to further confuse the situation, and in a 
frantic effort to bolster his obviously invalid locations, 
Gibbs then proceeded to amend his Yellow Canaries, 
Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" and introduced into the 
' ' ' . 
same Area #2 entirely new, conflicting and overlapping 
clain1s as follows : Independence, Exhibit "G"; Inde-
pendence Fraction, Exhibit "H"; Anita Gae #1, Exhibit 
"I"; Grover Gibbs Fraction, Exhibit "J"; Fraction, Ex-
hibit "L"; Yellow Canarie Fraction, Exhibit "M"; Yel-
low Canarie Fractions #1, #2 and #4, Exhibits "0", "P" 
and "Q". The ultimate confusion is such that in the Find-
ings and Decree, no mention is made of several claims 
covered by Defendants' Exhibits and testimony. Title to 
one claim (Grover Gibbs F·raction #2) .is quieted al-
though there is no proof in the record of any such claim. 
Further, no attempt is made in said Decree to show the 
location of any of Defendants' Claims, which ones arp 
valid and which invalid as covering the same ground and 
discoveries, and how, where, and with which of Defend-
ants' Claims the Plaintiffs' Claims conflict. We share the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
44 
confusion ·of Defendants' counsel and the lower Court and 
appreciate and understand their inability to determine 
the actual locations of Defendants' Claims and the iden-
tity of the Claims on which Defendants are actually 
relying. 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE DECREE ENTERED HEREIN IS AGAINST 
THE LAW. 
Appellants respectfully take the position that in view 
of all of the testimony and evidence in this case, the re-
fusal of the trial Court to enter a Decree quieting Plain-
tiffs' title to the three Juanita Mining Claims and to the 
Debra F·raction #10 Mining claim was and is contrary 
to law. We contend that a proper application of proven 
facts to governing principles of law by this Court will 
require a reversal of the Decree entered by the lower 
Court with directions to enter a new Decree quieting 
Plaintiffs' title. We base this contention upon the follow-
Ing: 
(A) DEFENDANT H. SPENCER GIBBS, HAVING 
ONCE ESTABLISHED HIS YELLOW CANARIE CLAIMS 
AT A GIVEN LOCATION, IS THEREAFTER BOUND BY 
HIS ACTS AND DECLARATIONS AND HE MAY NOT 
SUBSEQUENTLY CLAIM NEW GROUND IN AN ENTIRELY 
DIFFERENT PHYSICAL AREA (AREA #2) UNDER THE 
PRIORITY DATE OF HIS ORIGINAL LOCATION IN AREA 
#1 WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH LAW AS TO THE LOCA-
TION OF THE CLAIMS IN THE NEW AREA. 
The policy and general purpose declared by the 
several acts of the Federal Congress relating to the ar-
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quisition of rights in the public do1nain for 1nining pur-
poses has been to encourage the. orderly and economic 
development of the country's mineral resources. The 
several states have power to regulate the location of 
mining claims \vhere such regulations are not in conflict 
with the Federal Constitution and Laws. In this juris-
diction, beginning with the laws of 1899, our Legislature 
has enacted regulatory and procedural laws for the 
orderly location of mining claims. These laws are found 
in Title 40, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, being 
the same provisions as Title 55, Chapter 1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943. We quote the pertinent sections of 
said laws as follows : 
"40-1-2. Discovery Monument-Notice of Loca-
tion-Contents. 
The locator, at the time of making a dis-
covery of such vein or lode must erect a monument 
at the place of discovery and p·ost thereon his 
notice of location which shall contain: 
1. The name of the claim. 
2. The name of the locator or locators. 
3. The date of location. 
4. If a lode claim, the number of linear feet 
claimed in length along the course of the 
vein each way from the point of dis-
covery, with the width claimed on each 
side of the center of the vein, and the 
general course of the vein or lode as near 
as may be, an.d such a description of the 
claim, located by reference to some na-
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tural object or perntanent 1nonn1nent as 
will identify the claim ... " 
"40-1-3. Boundaries to be Marked. 
!\:fining claims and millsites must be distinctly 
marked on the ground so that the boundaries 
thereof can be readily traced. 
"40-1-4. Copy of Location Notice to be R.ecorded. 
Within thirty days after the date of posting 
the Location Notice upon the claim, the locator 
or locators, or his or their assigns, must file for 
record in the office of the county record of the 
county in which such claim is located a substantial 
copy of such Notice of Location ... " 
We regard it as too well settled to require citation 
of authorities that the Notice of Location referred to in 
40-1-2 above is required for the purpose of proper identi-
fication of the physical location of a mining claim, and 
when said Notice is properly recorded it furnishes con-
structive notice to all the world of the contents contained 
therein and establishes a priority of location for the clai1n 
described in said No-tic e. For the purpose of securing the 
definite and plain description of a mining claim which the 
above cited statutes require and to direct attention in a 
general way to the locality in which the clailn can be 
found, the statutes provide that the record of 1nining 
claims shall contain a description of the claim by refer-
ence to some natural object or permanent n1onmnent 
(Hammer vs. Garfield Mining etc. Company, 130 lT.R. 
291). 
We are prepared to acknowledge, and we recognize 
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it to be the law, that if the original Notices of Location 
of the Y ello'v Canarie #1, #2 and #3 as recorded by De-
fendant H. Spencer Gibbs on Aprjl26, April26, and June 
8, 1949, respectively, Exhibits "A", "B", and "C", had 
properly described said clain1s by reference to natural 
objects or permanent n1onuments sufficient to identify 
the san1e and to give constructive notice to subsequent 
locators and if, in addition, said Claims had then been 
located correctly on the ground in Area #2 and in ac-
cordance with the Notices, then Gibbs 'vould have had a 
clear priority of location as to Yellow Canarie #1; and 
Yellow Canaries #2 and #3 would not have conflicted with 
Plaintiffs' Juanita Claims. By the same token, we deem 
it to be the law that if the descriptions contained in said 
Notices of Location did not properly describe said Claims 
with reference to natural objects or permanent monu-
ments as to identify the land actually claimed by Gibbs, 
then said Notices of Location were legal nullities and 
any priority claimed thereunder is subsequent and in-
ferior to the rights of an intervening locator who meets 
the requirements of law regarding mining locations. The 
same result would follow if the prior claims were not 
correctly established on the ground. 
This Court has on at least two occasions applied this 
rule to varying factual situations. In the early case of 
Copper Globe Mining Comp·any 'vs. Allman et al} 23 Utah 
410, 64 P. 1019, this Court held: 
"A mining location is not perfected until all 
of the essential statutory requirements are per-
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formed. A locator of a mining claim only acquires 
exclusive right to the possession of the claim ""hen 
all of the necessary requirements for a location 
ai~ observed; and, if he neglects to perform any 
necessary requirements within the time prescribed 
by statute, his attempted location is of no avail 
against an intervening location peaceably and 
regularly made and covering the same ground, al-
though he shall have performed the neglected re-
quirement after the inception of the second loca-
tion." 
In the later case of M iehlich et al vs. Tintic Standard 
Mining Compa.ny, 60 Utah 569, 211 P. 686, this Court 
held: 
"Where a notice of location of a mining 
claim failed to describe the land claimed and no 
amended notice was posted and recorded describ-
ing the boundaries until after other parties had 
located a conflicting claim, the latter, having 1net 
all of the requirements of the statutes relative to 
the holding of their claim were properly awarded 
the conflict area." 
In Wiltsee vs. King of Arizona Mining & Milling 
Company, 7 Arizona 95, 60 P. 896, the Supre1ne Court 
of Arizona held regarding a situation where the locator 
changed the easterly end of the claims from where it was 
first located by his Location Notice to a point 800 feet 
northerly as fixed by the Location Certificate, as follows: 
"If a locator of a mining claim, \V hen posting 
his notice of location, in addition to giving the 
general course of his vein, places Inonuinents at 
the center of each end line thereof, thus giving 
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definite notice to subsequent locators as to the 
meaning of his notice, he is bound thereby, and 
cannot thereafter, during the time prescribed 
by law for perfecting his location, change the 
course of his location to the p-rejudice of inter-
vening rights." 
Also, the Supreme Court of Colorado has adopted 
the same rule in the case of Washington Gold lJfining & 
Milling Compa.ny vs. O'Laughlin, 46 Colorado 503, 105 P. 
1092, wherein the identity of the claims as situated upon 
the ground varied materially from the wording of the 
Location Notice: 
"Where the original location certificate of a 
mining location was insufficient because so defec-
tive as to prevent one from identifying or desig-
nating the claim on the ground, an amended certi-
ficate could not include other or different terri-
tory so as to injure intervening rights." 
To the same effect are Golden Fleece Gold & Silver 
Mining Compamy vs. Cable Consolidated Gold & Silver 
Mining Company, 12 Nev. 312; Nelson vs. Smith, 42 Nev. 
302, 176 P. 261; Ringling vs. Mahurin, 59 Montana 38, 197 
P. 829; Bair vs. Anderson, 98 Colo. 532, 58 P. 2d 484. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held in the case of 
Brown vs. Levarn, 4 Idaho 794, 46 P. 661, as follows: 
"Where the description and reference to a 
natural object or permanent monument is of such 
a character that a mining engineer could not find 
the claim from the Location Notice and where 
it is such that the claim may be floated anywhere 
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to suit the ground or to cover ore that may have 
been since discovered, it is clearly such a ~~ otice 
as cannot furnish a foundation for a valid loca-
tion." 
The S·upreme Court of California has like,vise held 
in the case of Mutchmor vs. McCarty, 149 Calif. 603, 87 
P. 85, where aN otice of Location of a lode claim failed to 
contain a description of the claim by a reference to a 
natural object or permanent monun1ent by which it could 
be identified as required by the Revised Statutes of the 
United States, Section 2324, it was ineffective for any 
purpose. 
See also Walton vs. Wild Goose, Mining Company, 
123 F. 209; McCGJY~~Yt vs. McMillam, 129 Calif. 350, 62 P. 
31. 
The sufficiency of the location of a mining claim 
with reference to natural objects or permanent monu-
ments, ordinarily is a question of fact (Bonanza Con-
solidated Minilng Company vs. Golden Head MininrJ Com-
pany, 29 Utah 159, 80 P. 736; Wells vs. Davis, 22 lJtah 
322, 6'2 P. 3; F·arming-ton Gold Mining Con1pany vs. 
Rhymney Gold arnd Copper Company, 20 Utah 363, !1R P. 
832). We submit that the weight of Plaintiffs' evidence 
concerning the actual location and identity of the natural 
objects and fixed monuments referred to in the N otires 
of Location of Yellow Canarie Claims #1 and #2 (Exhi-
bits "A" and "B") to-wit: "Along Old County Tiighway 
two miles northeast of Marysvale, Utah," when consider-
ed in the light of Defendants' evidence, was sufficient to 
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require the trial Court to conclude that Defendant Gibbs 
located his Yellow Canarie Claims along the east side 
of the Old Piute County Highway approximately two 
miles northeast of l\Iarysvale, Utah, (Area #1) and not 
in Area #2 as he no"\v contends. Furthermore, even in 
Area #2 and considering only Defendants' evidence, their 
claims were not validly located but were moved back and 
forth, around and about, until finally not even the De-
fendants knew where their claims were. Furthermore, 
we contend that the trial Court should have found as a 
matter of law that because of the variance between the 
declarations contained in Defendants' Notices as to loca-
tion and the actual locations thereof on the ground their 
claims were defective. 
F·or all these reasons, the locations of the Yell ow 
Canarie Claims in Area #2 were void and no priority 
should have been awarded to Defendant Gibbs thereon. 
The orderly development of mineral lands on the public 
don1ain requires such a ruling to prohibit the odious prac-
tice of "floating" claims from one area (Area #1) to an-
other (Area #2) or within the boundaries of one area 
(Area #2), in order to grab up· every valuable location 
site as its value becomes known. A location of a mining 
clai1n must be good when made, and each claimant must 
stand on his own location and may take only what it will 
give him under the law. 
(B) THE AMENDED NOTICES OF LOCATION OF 
DEFENDANTS' YELLOW CANARIE CLAIMS DO NOT CURE 
THE FATAL DEFECTS IN THEIR ORIGINAL NOTICES. 
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Exhibits "D" "E" and "F" are amended Notices of 
' Location for the Yellow Canarie Clain1s #1, #2 and #3, re-
spectively. Although these Notices recite that their pur-
pose was " ... to more fully describe this claim location 
to correct previous mistakes and discrepancies ... ", Ex-
hibit "D"; " ... for the purpose of more fully describing 
the position to adjoining claims also to correct corner 
post numbers the changing of location notice by persons 
unknown to me ... ", Exhibit "E"; and " ... for the pur-
pose of correcting any errors in the original location, 
of more accurately and definitely describing and defin-
ing th~ location and of taking in and acquirilng any 
ground that may have become open to location since the 
making of said original location ... ", Exhibit "F"; never-
theless, a comparision of the descriptions of the ground 
actually sought to be claimed by these Amended Notices 
of Location with the descriptions contained in the corres-
ponding original Notices for the Yellow Canarie Claims, 
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", and a consideration of the 
testimony of H. S·pencer Gibbs concerning his real in-
tention in amending the Yellow Canarie Claims will, we 
feel, convince this Court that the ultimate purpose of 
said Amended Notices of Location was to change the rela-
tive positions of said Claims in Area #2, to alter the 
physical size and shape of the Claims, and to take up 
entirely different ground under a priority date of the 
original Notices of Location for the respective Clain1s. 
We assert that amendments of this type are absolutely 
void under the law, and therefore the amendatory correr-
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tions sought to be achieved thereby do not relate back 
to the date of originalloca tion of said Clain1s. 
The original Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie 
#1 describes a mining clain1 1500 feet in length by 600 
feet in width, and it fixes the location thereof in Area #1. 
By Defendant Gibbs' own admission, the Amended Notice 
of Location on Yell ow Canarie #'1, Exhibit "D", describes 
a claim 300 feet in length and 600 feet in width (R. 326) 
but places the location thereof in an entirely ne\v and dif-
ferent area (Area #2). Further, Gibbs ad1nitted on the 
one hand that the net effect of this amendment \Vas to re-
duce Yellow Canarie #1 by four-fifths of its original size 
(R. 326), but on the other hand, he maintained that the 
Claim as amended covered the same identical ground as 
before the amendment (R. 326). The original Notice of 
Location of Yellow Canarie #2, Exhibit "B", fixed its lo-
cation north of Yellow Canarie #1 and "along Old County 
Highway". By amendment, Exhibit "F", the location 
of the claim is tied to the north side line of the Prospector 
Claims in Area #2 as shown on Exhibit 5. The record 
is so replete with evidence of fact that the Old Piute 
County Highway referred to in the original Notice of Lo-
cation of Yellow Canarie #2 is removed from any point 
in Area #2 by approximately two _miles that we will make 
no further reference to the matter. Comparing the loca-
tion of this Claim as set forth in the original Notice o.f 
Location thereof with the purported location as at-
tempted to be established by its Amended Notice of Loca-
tion, it is obvious that the amendment of Yellow Canarie 
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#2 describes a new and different claint tn an entirely 
new and different area. 
In the original Notice of Location of Yellow Canarie 
#3, Exhibit "C", the Claim is fixed as being west of 
Yellow Canarie #2. By amendment thereof, Exhibit "F", 
the position of Yell ow Canarie #3 is likewise placed "rest 
of Yell ow Canarie #2, but the more significant fact is that 
the amendment of Yellow Canarie #1, Exhibit "D", says 
that Yellow· Canarie #3 was then west of Yellow Canari.e 
#1. We challenge the Defendant to show to this Court 
how it is possible for Yellow Canari.e #3 after a1nendment 
to be west of Yellow Canarie #1, when originally it 'vas 
\vest of Yellow Canarie #2, unless the Claim by amend-
ment had been moved substantially south of its original 
position. A claim 1500 feet long cannot be stretched to 
twice its length.· It is at once obvious that by a1nendn1ent 
Yellow Canarie #3 was moved to a point south of its 
original position. All of the physical evidence on the 
ground found by both A. R. Shelton and George H. Ryan, 
the Engineers and Surveyors, substantiates this fact. 
Their maps clearly show that after amendment in 1950 
the position of Yellow Canarie #3 had radically changed 
from its original position as the north,vest Clailn lorate(l 
west of Yellow Canarie #2. 
We contend that since the original Notices of Loca-
tion for the Yellow Canarie Claims were void, the fatal 
defects therein contained could not be cured by ainend-
ment of said Claims, even assuming that the a1nend1nents 
in all respects complied with governing la\\·. Jn support 
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thereof 've cite to the Court the leading Colorado case 
of Sulli.van et al vs. Sharp et al, 33 Colo. 3±6, 80 P. 1054, 
wherein it is held as follo,vs: 
'•The right of a locator to file an additional 
certificate (amendment) can only avail him where 
there was an original location valid though im-
perfect." 
In the more recent case of S ackville vs. },f ann et al., 
135 P. 2d 101-±, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed 
the rule above cited and held as follows : 
"Where the original location of a m1n1ng 
claim was void, such a void location cannot be 
made valid by filing an additional location certifi-
cate (amendn1ent) under statute providing for the 
filing of an additional certificate to cure a defec-
tive original certificate." 
See also Johnson vs. Young, 18 Colo. 625, 34 P. 173; 
Strepy vs. Stark, 7 Colo. 614, 5 P. 111; and Moyle vs. 
Bullene et al, 7 Colo. A. 308, 44 P. 69. 
Moreover, even if the Court determines that the ori-
ginal Notices of Location on the Yello'v Canarie Claims 
were not void, still, for the factual reasons outlined 
above, the subsequent amendments to. the Yellow Canarie 
Claims are nevertheless invalid since they constitute an 
attempt to add new and different ground and to acquire 
new and different rights in the Defendants to·the preju-
dice of Plaintiffs' lawful rights in Area #2 and which had 
accrued between the date of original location of the 
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Yellow Canarie Claims and the dates of amendments 
thereto. 
The Supreme Court of California in the case of 
Gobert vs. Butterfield, et al, 136 P. 516, has held,: 
"An amended notice of location of a mining 
claim relates back to the original Notice notwith-
standing intervening locations, if made to cure ob-
. vious defects iln the original notice without in-
cluding any new ground." 
The Federal rule appears to be identical. Bunker 
Hill & Sulliva-n Mining d!; Concentrating Company vs. 
Empire State - Idaho Mining & Development Cornpany, 
~34 F. 268, holds as follows: 
"While a mining location may be amended 
without the forfeiture of any rights acquired by 
the original location except such as are inconsist-
ent with the amendment, no new right can be had 
which is inconsistent with those acquired by other 
locators made between the dates of the original 
and such amended-location." 
In the Washington Gold Mining & Milling Compan;y 
vs. 0' Laughlin case, supra, the Supreme Court of Colo-
rado has held : 
"Where the original location certificate of the 
mining location was insufficient because so defe('-
tive as to prevent one from identifying or desig-
nating the claim on the ground, an amended certi-
ficate could not include other or different terri-
tory so as to injure intervening rights.'' 
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See also Morris on et al vs. Regan, 8 Idaho 291, 6·7 
P. 955; Bismark ]}fountain Gold Mining Company vs. 
North Sunbeam Gold Conzpan,y, 14 Idaho 516, 95 P. 14. 
Without Inore, "\Ve urge upon the Court the necessity 
of establishing in this jurisdiction the rule of authority 
prevailing in the other \Yestern mining states that amend-
ments of Notices of Location to mining claims of the type 
before the Court are void and of no curative effect what-
soever and do not relate back to the priority date of the 
original Notices of Location. 
(C) PLAINTIFFS, HAVING COMPLIED WITH EVERY 
AFFIRMATIVE LEGAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE LOCA-
TIONS OF THE THREE JUANITA CLAIMS AND THE 
DEBRA FRACTION #10, AND BEING FREE FROM ANY 
FRAUD OR DECEPTION THEREIN, IN -EQUITY AND 
JUSTICE SHOULD NOT BE DIVESTED OF THEIR RIGHTS 
BY REASON OF THE SUBSEQUENT DESTRUCTION, 
MOVEMENT OR OBLITERATION OF THEIR STAKES AND 
MONUMENTS BY OTHERS. 
As we read the record we conclude that the only di-
rect attack made upon Plaintiffs' mining locations by the 
Defendants other than their assertion that their Yello'N 
Canarie Claims were prior in time in Area #2 to those 
of the Plaintiffs, which assertion we feel we have shown 
to the Court to be entirely fictitious, is their testimo~y 
that certain of Plaintiffs' monuments and corner stakes 
were observed by them in other areas and within the 
boundaries of other claims. As heretofore pointed out, 
· Plaintiff Clemore acknowledged that his markers and 
monuments had been moved onto other claims at least 
three different times subsequent to his original locations, 
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and Exhibit 5 shows that this condition existed in Novenl· 
ber, 1950, all in spite of every preventive measure Cl-:-
more could take. We call attention to the fact, however, 
that all of the evidence on this point comes either from 
the Defendants then1selves or from their agents. \Y. e feel, 
therefore, that such evidence should be cautiously con-
sidered in the light of possible self-preserving motives. 
Moreover, it is well settled law that a locator, having 
complied with statutory requirements for the location 
of his claims, cannot be divested of his lawful right~ 
therein by the removal or obliteration of his 1nonu1nents 
and stakes. We cite as authority for this proposition 
the recent decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in the 
case of Nichols et al. vs. Ora Taho1na Mining Company 
et al, 151 P. 2d 615, wherein the Court discusses this 
matter at length and holds as follows: 
"The general rule is that when a location is 
once sufficiently marked on the surface so that its 
boundaries can be readily traced and all other acts 
of location are performed as required by law, the 
right of possession is fully vested in the locator. 
and he cannot be divested of his right by the re-
moval or obliteration or destruction of the monu-
ments, stakes, marks or notices done without hi~ 
fault, while he continues to perforn1 the necessary 
work upon the claim." 
To the same effect is Gobert vs. Butterfield, fron1 
the California Supreme Court, supra, wherein the Court 
holds on this point: 
"If a mining claim is sufficiently 1narked on 
the ground, and all necessary acts of Iocn tion are 
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done the right thereby acquired by the locator cann~t be divested by the subsequent obliteration 
of the location 1narks or removal of the stakes 
without the locator's fault, and the fact that the 
stakes cannot afterwards be found places no in-
f·erence against the sufficiency of the original 
markings." 
See also Book vs. Justice Mining Co1npa,ny, 5S F. 
106; Steele vs. Preble, 77 P. 2d 418; Moore vs. Steelsmith, 
1 Alaska 121; 2 Lindley on JJ[ ines, 3rd Ed., Section 375, 
Page 890, n. 68 ; 1 Snyder on Mines, Section 399 ; 36 A'm. 
Jur. IJ!Iines &·Minerals, Section 94, Page 346; Shamel, 
Mining ll,!ilneral a.nd Geological Law, Sec. 530; 40 C.J. 
Mines and Minerals, Sec. 212, p. 801, n. 64. 
(D) APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF "GOOD 
FAITH." 
Plaintiffs located their Debra Fraction #10 and three 
Juanita Claims in Area #2 with prior knowledge of the 
fact that Defendants had fraudulently "floated" their 
Yell ow Canarie Claims from Area #1 into Area #2, and 
that therefore Defendants' Claims were utterly void. 
Realizing the fraudulent conduct of the Defendants and 
knowing of the complete invalidity of Defendants' pur-
ported locations in Area #2, Plaintiffs made a peaceful 
entry in Area #2 pursuant to their lawful rights as citi-
zens of the United States to locate mining claims upon 
open and unoccupied public lands. Plaintiffs acted in 
complete good faith for they did no more than they had 
a lawful right to do. On the other hand, Defendants' con-
duct from the beginning date of April 25, 1949, and the 
original locations as of that date in Area #1 continuing 
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up to and including the trial itself and including the 
"floating" of their Claims fron1 Area #1 to Area #2, the 
shuffling of their locations in Area #2, their acts in 
amending and moving existing claims, changing relative 
positions, and adding new, overlapping and conflicting 
claims were obviously fraudulent as to both the {Tnited 
States and all other parties interested in Area #2, and 
demonstrate an utter lack of that "good faith" required 
of those who seek to locate mining claims. 
If Defendants had been in good faith, they could 
have made entirely new and complete locations in Area 
#2 when they finally entered that Area, but instead they 
sought to preserve the priority dates given them, if they 
succeeded in their fraud, by their original locations in 
Area #1. When they entered Area #2 they knew of prior 
claims in that Area, so in an attempt to defeat and ante-
date those claims they relied on· "floating" instead of 
"locating". The instant action is a result of that fraudu-
lent conduct on Defendants' part. 
Appellants fully agree with the salutary doctrine 
of law that in possessory actions of this type good faith 
upon the part of one locating mining claims is a factor 
to be concluded. Several of the cases heretofore cited 
make reference to this doctrine. In Bismark Ill in.in.q 
Company vs. North Sunbeam Company, supra, the Court 
said: 
''It is the well settled doctrine of all of the 
later decisions that location notices and rerords 
should receive a liberal eonstruction to the end 
of upholding a location 1nade in good faith.·· 
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Said case also quotes 'vith approval the following 
from Londonderry 1llining Company vs. United G. M. 
Company, 38 Colo. 480, 88 P. 455, as follows: 
"Every case where this question is raised 
must· therefore depend upon its own circunl-
stances. As previously stated, the purpose of such 
location certificate is to give notice to subsequent 
locators; and if by reasonable construction the 
language descriptive of the status of a claim, aid-
ed or unaided by testimony, will do so it is suffi-
cient in this respect. In other words, the object 
of requiring a reference to a natural objeet or per-
manent monument is to furnish means by which 
to identify the ·claim, and whatever reference will 
accomplish this object satisfies the law." 
It is said in the annotation enti tied Location of Min-
ing Claims, in 7 L.R.A., N.S-. 763, as to the purpose of the 
requirement of marking upon the ground, at Page 856: 
"The object of the law in requiring the loca-
tion of the mining claim to be marked upon the 
ground is to fix the claim and prevent swinging 
or floating so that those who in good faith are 
looking for unoccupied ground in the vicinity 
of previous locations may be able to ascertain ex-
actly what has been appropriated in order to make 
the locations upon the residue." 
See also Johnson vs. Ryan, 43 N.M. 127, 86 P. 2d 
1040. This doctrine is well stated in the California case 
of Brown vs. Murphy, 97 P. 2d 281, wherein ·the· Court 
said: 
"A person who knows that a mining .claim is 
in the actual possession of another cannot honestly 
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believe that it is vacant and subject to entry and 
relocation; and the entry under such circum-
stanees cannot be made in good faith unless it is 
made upon some right or color of right or clahn 
of legal right to m.ake the entry. Such a claint 
of right must exist before the entry to constitute 
good faith in making the entry. 
"If it does not exist, the entry is made without 
color of right or color of title and is an entrY in 
bad faith for actual possession in ·another is prima 
facie evidence of ti tie· in the possessor and is pro-
tected in the law against lawless invasion 'vithout 
right or color of right, but one who has a title and 
present right of possession may also take peace-
able possession of what he claims to ~e his own." 
But the Court also qualifies the application of this 
doctrine as follows: 
"It is true, generally speaking, that any com-
petent locator, for the purpose of negotiating a 
location for himself, may enter upon mineral land 
of the United States which is not covered b.u rali:l 
subsisting locatio-n., even though it be in the actual 
possession of another, but still said entry n1ust he 
peaceable and in good faith." 
A careful consideration of the cases and authorities 
above cited will show that the prohibition against subse-
quent entry up,on areas already in the possession of a 
prior claimant applies to situations where there had been 
but a very technical or unimportant failure on the part of 
the prior claimants to co1nply with the law regarding 
the location of mining clailns. In Dennis v~. Banu:tf, 
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85 P. :2d 916, the description eontained in the Notices of 
Location was somewhat vague, but still sufficient to 
properly identify the location of the clain1. In Johnson 
vs. Ryan., supra, there. had been a failure to record the 
Notices of Location, although every other require1nen t 
of la-\v had been con1plied 'vith. ·In Eaton vs. Norris, 63 
P. 856, the relocator had "been watching the Plaintiff 
during the summer of 1897, to see if he did the required 
amount of assessment work on his clain1" (page 857). In 
Brown vs~ Murphy, supra, the parties seeking to relocate 
the claims relied upon the fact that the exterior bounda-
ries of the claims had not been marked and that there 
existed discrepancies or variations in the instruments 
comprising the owner's chain of title. The evidence fur-
ther showed that the relocator had been on the premises 
on numerous occasions for several years prior to the 
action, had taken san1ples of ore therefrom with the per-
mission of the owners of the claims, and had unsuccess-
fully attempted to lease the property f'rom the known 
owners prior to the action. 
We contend that the facts and evidence presented to 
the trial Court clearly negative the application of any 
"good faith" doctrine herein in favor of Defendants. In 
the case at bar, the Yellow Canarie Claims as located 
in Area #2 were not merely defective by reason of a tech-
nical non-compliance with the letter of the law, but were 
absolutely void. For the numerous reasons heretofore 
stated said Claims had violated the fundamental pre-
cepts of basic mining law. After all, the object of the law 
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in requiring the location of a mining claim to be marked 
upon the ground is to fix the location of the clai1n and to 
prevent floatilng so that those who are looking for un-
occupied ground may be able to ascertain exactly what 
has been appropriated in order to make locations upon 
the residue. Liberality in the interpretation of Location 
Notices to the end that honest though inept locations will 
be protected must son1ewhere give way to the prerogative 
of other 1niners to pursue their lawful rights on the public 
domain. Otherwise, a truly chaotic condition will result 
and the Courts will be led into the gr'evious error of en-
couraging the "floating" of claims at the caprice of any 
locator who, ·having once placed his claim, thereafter 
finds a "greener pasture." If Defendants are allowed 
to suceeed in this action and if their conduct is counten-
anced by this Court,_ the orderly development of the 
Marysvale uranium area and of other mineral sections 
will be jeopardized. Our Courts will be confronted 'vith 
numerous cases involving the "floating" of clain1s, and 
no locator will be safe from the "jumping" of his claim 
by one who moves into a Inore valuable area a clain1 he 
has located originally in a section which proves to be of 
little or no value. Justice and fair dealing require a 
reversal of the Decree and judgment of the lower Court. 
POINT 3. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
LAW. 
Plaintiffs make no separate argu1nent relative to the 
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lower Court's rulings on admission of evidence at the 
trial. 
POINT 4. 
THAT ON THE BASIS OF THE EVIDENCE AND REC-
ORD IN THIS CAUSE, NEW FINDINGS OF FACT, CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ENTERED. 
For . the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs submit 
that they are entitled to new Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree in their favor. 
POINT 5. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs assert that for all the reasons set forth 
above, the lower Court committed error in denying their 
Motion for a New Trial, and submit that said Court, 
pursuant to Rule 59(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
should have made New Findings, Conclusions and, Judg-
ment in Plaintiffs' favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants contend that the evidence and testimony 
presented to the lower Court clearly entitle them to a 
Decree quieting their title to their Juanita #1, #2 and #3 
and D'ebra Fraction #10 Claims against each and every 
claim of Defendants conflicting therewith and subject 
only to the paramount title of the United States of Amer-
ica, and preventing, enjoining and restraining the De-
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fendants from asserting any right, title or claim in and to 
the mining claims of the Plaintiffs above described. The 
pivotal question of the case is simply this : ,.Vas the 
ground located by Plaintiff Fred C. Clemore as the 
Juanita #1, #2 and #3 and Debra Fraction #10 Claims 
open and unoccupied land subject to location for n1ining 
claims on their respective dates of location by PlaintiffT 
We have confidence that this Court will ans,ver said 
question affirmatively in Plaintiffs' favor. All other 
questions presented by the evidence clearly resolve them-
selves in Plaintiffs' favor for the record is silent upon 
any other attack upon Plaintiffs' locations. The result 
of the Defendants' present position in this action is on 
its face so grossly inequitable as to be unconscionable. 
We submit that for all of the reasons heretofore stated, 
the decision of the trial Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CARVEL MATTSSON 
and 
JOHN T. VERNIEU 
FOR GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants 
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